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Background: Human decision-making is often affected by prior selections and their outcomes, even in situations
where decisions are independent and outcomes are unpredictable.
Methods: In this study, we created a task that simulated real-life non-strategic gambling to examine the effect of
prior outcomes on subsequent decisions in a group of male college students.
Results: Behavioral performance showed that participants needed more time to react after continuous losses
(LOSS) than continuous wins (WIN) and discontinuous outcomes (CONTROL). In addition, participants were more
likely to repeat their selections in both WIN and LOSS conditions. Functional MRI data revealed that decisions in
WINs were associated with increased activation in the mesolimbic pathway, but decreased activation in the inferior
frontal gyrus relative to LOSS. Increased prefrontal cortical activation was observed during LOSS relative to WIN and
CONTROL conditions.
Conclusion: Taken together, the behavioral and neuroimaging findings suggest that participants tended to repeat
previous selections during LOSS trials, a pattern resembling the gambler’s fallacy. However, during WIN trials,
participants tended to follow their previous lucky decisions, like the ‘hot hand’ fallacy.Introduction
Decision-making is a goal-directed cognitive function in-
volving the processes to choose from available options
associated with varying levels of risk, uncertainty and
reward [1]. Decision-making under risk conditions is
important for adaptive behaviors [2]. However, the
decision-making process is often affected by prior selec-
tions and their outcomes [3-6], even when subjects
know that trials are independent and outcomes are ran-
dom [7,8]. A recent study showed that participants were
more risk seeking after losing a gamble than after win-
ning a gamble [3]. This pattern of increased risk-taking
following losses has been proposed to arise from a cog-
nitive distortion termed the ‘gambler’s fallacy’, which is
the belief that if deviations from expected behaviors are* Correspondence: dongguangheng@zjnu.edu.cn
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process, future deviations in the opposite direction are
then more likely.
Risky decision-making refers to choices that may result
in reward or punishment yet the outcome is not fully
predictable. Laboratory tasks often model risk-taking in
two ways. One way is that the risk level (i.e. probability
of a reward versus punishment) varies while the amount
of potential reward or punishment remains stable. Xue’s
study investigated the risk taking level after varying
levels of wins or losses, and reported gambler’s fallacy
during decision-making process [3]. Another way is that
the risk level remains stable while the reward/punish-
ment outcomes are random and trials are independent,
as with coin tosses where the probability of a win or loss
is always 50% for each independent trial [9]. The aim of
the current study was to assess whether previous outcomes
(continuous wins or losses) would affect subsequent
decision-making and its neural correlates as assessed usingtd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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risk level is held constant.
Psychological studies on the gambler’s fallacy have pri-
marily viewed it as a cognitive bias produced by a psy-
chological heuristic: people believe short sequences of
random events should be representative of longer ones
[10]. In this study, we designed decision-making task for
fMRI. This task modeled continuous wins or losses
using a simple gambling paradigm, and would allow us
to assess how prior outcomes (gain vs. loss) affecting sub-
sequent decision-making. Although participants were in-
formed that the outcomes of their choice during the task
were ‘random’, they were actually organized into series of
continuous wins (WIN), continuous losses (LOSS), or
pseudo-random non-continuous outcomes (CONTROL).
The WIN and LOSS series were included to create the ef-
fect from previous outcomes.
As a consequence of experimental confounds that are re-
lated to decision processes, some brain regions, such as the
inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula (IFG/AI) and anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC), are involved in risky decision mak-
ing [11-14]. Thus, the brain features in the IFG and ACC
are on the focus of our study. At least three cognitive pro-
cesses are hypothesized to be involved during performance
of such a decision-making task: decision process (reward-
seeking/punishment-avoidance), executive inhibition, and
processing of reward/punishment (feedback). Recent neu-
roimaging studies have identified the neural activities of
decision-making under risk [15-17]. First, in healthy sub-
jects, increased reward exposure is associated with in-
creased brain activity in mesolimbic regions [18,19], which
has been demonstrated to be sensitive to reward and pun-
ishment [20,21]. Second, the prefrontal cortex is implicated
in inhibition and contextual analysis in resolving the un-
certainty, while the striatum plays a role in the evalu-
ation of prospective risky outcomes [22,23]. Third, the
caudate has been demonstrated to be highly involved in
learning and memory, particularly regarding feedback
processing [24]. The activity in caudate can be expected
in our study because the continuous outcomes will
bring strong feedbacks.
The present task allowed us to test three independent
hypotheses. First, continuous wins or losses would
heighten participants’ desire to win in the subsequent
trial. We hypothesized that continuous wins would
reinforce their gambling behaviors (which could be
indexed by changes in response time), and would be ac-
companied by increased activities in mesolimbic regions.
Second, continuous losses would elicit frustration that
would affect subsequent decision-making, and which
would associate with a greater activation in the frontal
regions. Third, the continuous wins would bring partici-
pants the fallacious belief of the success in the coming
attempts, as known the ‘hot hand fallacy’ [25], which isthe belief that one success with a random event indi-
cates a good chance of further success in additional at-
tempts. Therefore, we hypothesized that participant’s
feedback related brain regions, such as caudate [26,27]
might show higher activation after continuous wins.
Methods
Participant selection
The Human Investigations Committee at Zhejiang Normal
University approved this study (zjnuhe09062). All par-
ticipants provided written informed consent. Thirty-one
male subjects (22.8 ± 3.4 years) participated in this
study. This study focused on male participants because
of the higher prevalence rates of gambling in males com-
pared to females [28-30]. All subjects underwent struc-
tured psychiatric interviews (M.I.N.I.) [31] performed by
an experienced psychiatrist and no active Axis I disorders
were present. Depression was further assessed using the
Beck Depression Inventory [32] with an exclusionary cut-
off 5. All participants are right handed and no head injury
with unconsciousness during their lifetime.
Task and procedure
A reality-simulated guessing task was designed to create
gain or loss circumstances. In the task each trial started
with the presentation of the backside of two playing
cards. Participants were asked to choose either the right
or the left card with a button press in 1.5 second. After
1.5 s the selected card was turned over for 2 s. Depend-
ing on the color of the card the participant either won
(red) or lost (black) 10 Yuan (about 1.6 USD). At the
end of this presentation a black screen appeared for 1–
1.5 s [33] (Figure 1). The whole task consisted of 245 tri-
als grouped into two blocks, one for 120 trials while the
other for 125 trials (only the results of the last 5 trials
were totally random, which is to make the final results
seems randomly) with one minute between blocks. The
whole task runs 1260 seconds (21 minutes). E-prime
software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.) was used to
present the task and acquire behavioral data.
At the beginning of each study session, each partici-
pant started with a balance of 50 Yuan, and was expli-
citly informed that he would receive the entire balance
in cash at the end of the scanning session. If participant
missed to press the key during the selection period, the
results will be ‘lose’. Data from any participants choosing
the same card for more than 75 percent of all trials or
for more than 10 continuous trials were excluded from
further analysis (although none of the participants were
excluded in this study). This procedure enabled us to
control the sequence of wins and losses, and yet gave
the participant the impression of free choice.
Although participants were informed that the outcome
of each trial dependent on their choice, the task used a
Figure 1 The timeline of one trial in present task. First, the backsides of two playing cards were shown and participants were asked to
choose either the right or the left card with a button press. After 1.5 s the selected card was turned over and displayed for another 2 s.
Depending on the color of the card the participant either won (red playing cards, including the heart and diamond J, Q, K) or lost (black playing
cards; including the spade and club J, Q, K) 10 Yuan. After a total presentation time of 2 s, a black screen was presented for 1500 ms.
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trials: (1) Trials after 3 consecutive winning outcomes
(WIN). (2) Trials after 3 consecutive losing outcomes
(LOSS). (3) Trials after pseudo-random outcomes with-
out more than two consecutive wins or losses (CON-
TROL). Besides the decision making phase, we also paid
attention to the brain activations in reward phase, which
can make our results more persuasive (Figure 2).
To increase the number of WIN and LOSS trials
within 245 trials for minimizing the scanning time, some
trial sequences consisted of four or five continuous win/
lose outcomes, and the fourth and fifth trials in these se-
quences were included in analysis.
Image acquisition and pre-processing
Imaging data were acquired using a 3 T scanner (Siemens
Trio). Structural images covering the whole brain were col-
lected using a T1-weighted three-dimensional spoiled
gradient-recalled sequence (176 slices, TR = 1700 ms, TE =
3.93 ms, slice thickness = 1.0 mm, skip = 0 mm, flip angle =
15°, inversion time 1100 ms, field of view = 240*240 mm,
in-plane resolution = 256*256). Functional data wereFigure 2 Three types of conditions used in this study. We paid attentio
phase. Each phase were observed in three conditions: WIN, decision-makin
ing for 3 continuous times; and CONTROL, no repeated wins or losses in thacquired using a gradient-echo EPI T2 sensitive pulse se-
quence (interleaved sequence, 33 slices, 3 mm thickness,
TR = 2000 ms, flip angle 90°, field of view 220 × 220 mm2,
matrix 64 × 64). Stimuli were presented using Invivo syn-
chronous system (Invivo Company, www.invivocorp.com/)
through a mirror in the head coil.
Imaging analysis
Imaging was analyzed using SPM5 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.
ac.uk/spm). Preprocessing included slice-timing, motion
correction, realignment, normalizing to Montreal Neuro-
logical Institute (MNI) space, and spatially smoothing
using a 6 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. We used event re-
lated design to analyze the imaging data. SPM5 uses gen-
eral linear model (GLM) to assess task-related changes in
blood oxygen level dependence (BOLD) signal.
Six head-movement parameters derived from the realign-
ment were included as covariates. The design matrix mod-
eled WIN, LOSS, and CONTROL trials in decision making
phase and reward phase, separately. In addition to this, we
divided WIN and LOSS trials in decision-making phase
into WIN-stick, WIN-switch, LOSS-stick, and LOSS-n to two phases during this task: the decision phase and the reward
g after winning for 3 continuous times; LOSS, decision-making after los-
e last 3 trials.
Table 1 Comparisons among different conditions in the
decision-making task
Comparisons Mean difference Std. error Sig.
Response time (ms)
LOSS-WIN 40.12 13.56 .006
LOSS-CONTROL 36.36 10.98 .002
WIN-CONTROL −3.77 10.45 .721
Repeat rates
LOSS-WIN −1.07 2.19 .629
LOSS-CONTROL 13.93 1.76 .000
WIN-CONTROL 15.00 2.19 .000
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their selection to previous trial. The task set 40 trials
for every trial type (WIN, LOSS, CONTROL). How-
ever, participants might miss some trials during their
selection, and the missed trials were treated as LOSS in
our study. Thus, the number of WIN trial was usually
less than 40 (33–40).
Second-level analysis
Second level analysis treated inter-subject variability as a
random effect. The images for contrast (WIN-CON-
TROL, LOSS-CONTROL, WIN-LOSS) of each partici-
pant in different phases were imputed into second level
one-sample t-test separately. We first identified clusters
of contiguously significant voxels at an uncorrected
threshold p < 0.001, as also used for display purposes in
the figures. We then tested these clusters for cluster-
level FWE correction p < 0.05 and the AlphaSim estima-
tion indicated that clusters with 25 contiguous voxels
would achieve an effective FWE threshold p < 0.001 (We
actually used 30 contiguous voxels as minimum cluster
size). The smoothing kernel used during simulating
false-positive (noise) maps using AlphaSim was 6.0 mm,
and was estimated from the residual fields of the contrast
maps being entered into the one-sample t-test. The formula
used to compute the smoothness is that used in FSL (see
http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/analysis/techrep/tr00df1/tr00df1/
node6.html for more information).
We assessed correlations between changes in BOLD sig-
nal in selected region of interest and the behavioral perfor-
mances to verify our hypothesis. The first correlation was
between the changes in BOLD signal (peak beta value) in
the inferior frontal gyrus/ACC and differences in reaction
times (RTs) between LOSS and CONTROL conditions.
The second correlation was between the changes in BOLD
signal in the caudate significant clusters (mean value of
the three survived clusters) and the number of repeat card
choices during WIN. The values of each ROI were ex-
tracted using pipeline software Neuroelf (a pipeline fMRI
data processing software based on SPM5. Please visit neu-
roelf.net for more information).
Results
Behavioral performance
A repeated-measures ANOVA indicated a significant main
effect of trial type WIN (366.98 ± 17.77 ms), LOSS
(407.10 ± 21.41 ms), and CONTROL (370.75 ± 17.81 ms))
on response time (RT) [F(2,30) = 7.126, p = 0.002]. Post-
Hoc analysis (LSD) revealed slower RTs in the LOSS rela-
tive to WIN or CONTROL trials. RT did not significantly
differ between WIN and CONTROL trials (Table 1).
To assess whether subjects showed a selection bias in the
continuous conditions, we analyzed the repeated choice
rates in each condition. Participants tended to repeat theprevious choice during both WIN (67.21% ± 9.96) and
LOSS (66.14% ± 6.97) conditions, but not in the CON-
TROL (52.20% ± 6.92) (Table 1).
One important issue in binary choice task is ‘who cares’
thoughts during decision-making, because the outcomes
of the choice are independent, random, and equally likely.
Previous studies tried to avoid this situation by trying
some specific methods. For example, one study tried to
avoid this issue by using trinary choice with non-
equiprobable events [34]. In this study, the behavioral re-
sults (RTs, repeat rates) of different trial types suggested
that participants paid attention to the decision process,
and did not made choices randomly.Brain activations in reward/punishment phase
We compared the brain activations in the reward/pun-
ishment phase in different conditions. The comparison
between WIN and CONTROL showed that higher brain
activation was found in WIN trials in bilateral striatum,
right ACC and left posterior cingulate cortex. The beta
figure showed that the difference in striatum (mean peak
value in bilateral striatum) is caused by enhanced brain
activation in WIN (Table 2, Figure 3).
Lower bilateral striatum activation and left precuneus
activation were found in LOSS than in CONTROL. The
beta figure showed that the difference in striatum (mean
peak value in bilateral striatum) is caused by decreased
brain activation in LOSS (Table 2, Figure 3).Brain activations in decision-making phase
WIN vs. CONTROL
During the WIN relative to CONTROL condition, greater
BOLD signal was observed in the mesolimbic-frontal re-
gions, including the bilateral ventral striatum and the su-
perior frontal gyrus. The beta figures in bilateral striatum
showed that the difference was caused by the enhanced
brain activation in WIN (Table 2, Figure 4).
Table 2 Regional brain activity changes in different comparisons in decision-making and reward phases
x,y,za Peak intensity (t-value) Cluster sizeb Regionc Brodmann’s area
Decision phase
WIN - CONTROL (Higher activated)
12, 9, 3 5.93 124 R Ventral Striatum
−12, 3, 0 5.68 77 L Ventral Striatum
−12, 48, 30 6.02 210 L Superior Frontal Gyrus 9
LOSS - CONTROL (Higher activated)
21, 48, 33 6.97 1139 R Superior Frontal Gyrus 9,10
−42,15,-12 7.27 105 L Inferior Frontal Gyrus 47
36, 15, −18 6.94 180 R Inferior Frontal Gyrus 44
3, −21, 33 5.32 33 R Anterior Cingulate Gyrus 23
12, −12, 9 4.96 45 R Thalamus
−21, −39, 12 5.28 38 L Ventral Striatum
30, 27, 39 5.78 73 R Middle Temporal Gyrus 8
WIN - LOSS (Higher activated)
24, −36, 15 5.96 90 R Caudate
−21, −39, 12 5.63 49 L Caudate
WIN - LOSS (Lower activated)
18, 66, 18 −6.57 237 R Superior Frontal Gyrus 10
48, 12, −12 −5.76 149 R Inferior Frontal Gyrus 45
−24, 12, −21 −5.38 31 L Inferior Frontal Gyrus 47
Reward phase
WIN - CONTROL (Higher activated)
3, 48, 12 9.21 1929 R Anterior Cingulate 32
−3,-48,27 9.52 638 L Posterior Cingulate 23
12, 6, −3 4.53 157 R Striatum
−12, 9, −3 4.21 179 L Striatum
LOSS - CONTROL (Lower activated)
21, 6, 3 −9.48 689 R Striatum
−18, 3, −3 −9.50 450 L Striatum
−15,-54,39 −5.24 125 L Precuneus 7
aPeak MNI Coordinates.
bWe first identified clusters of contiguously significant voxels at an uncorrected threshold p < 0.001, as also used for display purposes in the figures. We then
tested these clusters for cluster-level FWE correction p < .05 and clusters with at least 30 voxels were survived. Voxel size = 3*3*3.
cThe brain regions were referenced to the software Xjview (http://www.alivelearn.net/xjview8) and double checked with atlas.
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The LOSS, relative to CONTROL, showed increased
BOLD signal in mesolimbic-frontal regions, including
the left ventral striatum and ACC. In addition, the in-
creased signals were also found in the bilateral inferior
frontal gyrus, middle temporal gyrus, and thalamus during
this process. The beta figures in IFG and striatum showed
that the difference is caused by the enhanced brain activa-
tion in LOSS (Table 2, Figure 5).
WIN vs. LOSS
The WIN condition showed greater BOLD signal increases
in bilateral caudate compared to LOSS. In contrast, theLOSS condition showed greater BOLD signal in the inferior
frontal gyrus and superior frontal gyrus compared to WIN
(Table 2, Figure 6). The beta figures showed that the differ-
ence in IFG is caused by enhance brain activation in LOSS,
and the difference I caudate is caused by the enhanced
brain activation in WIN.
Correlation results
First, beta values of the contrast of LOSS versus CON-
TROL in the inferior frontal gyrus and RT differences
between LOSS and CONTROL conditions showed a
marginally significant correlation (r = 0.381, p = 0.059).
Second, the beta values of the contrast of WIN versus
Figure 3 Brain activations in WIN/LOSS compare to CONTROL in reward phase. Left, comparison between WIN and CONTROL; Right,
comparison between LOSS and CONTROL.
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two survived clusters) and the rates of repeat card
choices during WIN showed a significant correlation
(r = 0.406, p = 0.038) (Figure 7). There is no significant
correlation (even marginally significant) between ACC
activation and behavioral performance; thus, we did
not present the figure here.Stick or switch in WIN and LOSS
We grouped WIN and LOSS trials based on whether
participants switched choice relative to the previous one.
They showed a mean of 27 WIN-stick, 13 WIN-switch,
23 LOSS-stick, and 12 LOSS-switch trials. We paid at-
tention to the activation of related brain areas (Caudate
in WIN and IFG in LOSS). The data in further analyses
were extracted from the peak values in these ROIs, no
matter whether they show differences among different
conditions or not. The IFG showed a greater increase in
BOLD signal in LOSS-stick than in LOSS-switch (t =
4.21, p = 0.041) (Figure 8a). The caudate showed a greater
increase in WIN-stick relative to WIN-switch (t = 6.35,
p = 0.009) (Figure 8b).Discussion
Using a task that simulates real-life gambling, we assessed
behavioral bias and its neural correlates using fMRI
in both WIN and LOSS conditions. In reward phase,
the higher striatum activations in WIN compare to
CONTROL and the decreased striatum activation in
LOSS are consistent with previous findings about the
role of striatum in rewarding and punishment (see Reviews[35,36]), these results make the results in decision-making
phase more persuasive.
Enhanced desire to win after WIN and LOSS
Consistent with our hypothesis, mesolimbic regions
(ventral striatum, superior frontal gyrus) showed greater
activations during WIN and LOSS relative to CONTROL.
These findings suggest that human decision-making is
modulated by reinforcement learning mechanisms sup-
ported by the ventral and dorsal striatum, even when
participants are aware that trial-to-trial outcomes are
independent and random. Both WIN and LOSS condi-
tions involved stronger activation in the reward system
(ventral striatum), which has been associated with
stronger desires to win [37]. Previous researches have
shown that ventral striatum is associated with reward-
related behaviors (obtain reward or avoid punishment)
[38,39]. Neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that
the ventral striatum responds to a variety of rewarding
stimuli, including both social and non-social rewards
[40]. In addition, the striatum has also been implicated
in choice-outcome contingency learning via feedback,
especially when they process the prediction results
leading to changes in decision-making [41,42].
According to the features of the task and the activa-
tion in the ventral striatum, we speculate that, relative
to CONTROL, WIN and LOSS conditions elicit a
greater desire to win in the next bet. These findings are
consistent with anecdotal reports in pathological gam-
blers and healthy individuals alike [43] that parti-
cipants’ desire to win is activated in continuous win
situations because they experience it as a streak of
Figure 4 Brain areas showing stronger activation when comparing WIN to CONTROL. Left: The activation include bilateral ventral striatum
and left superior frontal gyrus. Right: The Beta figures of ventral striatums showed that the difference was driven by the WIN.
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uals often want to win back their losses in their next
gamble. These cognitive biases may contribute to vul-
nerability to pathological gambling.
Gambler’s fallacy after continuous losses
In LOSS, people tend to repeat their previous choices
(66.14%). This pattern is known as the gambler’s fallacy.
They believe that, after losing so many times, same se-
lection of next bet should generate opposite outcomes
(win). The slower RT in LOSS relative to WIN or CON-
TROL might indicate that participants experienced more
conflicts during LOSS trials. Our imaging data showed
that decisions in LOSS were associated with greater ac-
tivities in the prefrontal network when compare WIN to
CONTROL. Previous imaging studies have shown that
frontal network is involved in cognitive control mecha-
nisms that support flexible, goal-directed behaviors, suchas conflict resolution, inhibition of prepotent responses
[42,44]. In this study, the higher frontal brain activation
in LOSS might suggest that participants engaged more
cognitive efforts during the decision-making. In addition
to this, LOSS-stick showed higher IFG brain activation
than LOSS-switch. Which suggest that LOSS-stick (gam-
bler’s fallacy) need more cognitive endeavor to evaluate
the situation and make decisions. The LOSS-switch is an
easy way in decision-making; it doesn’t need too much
cognitive endeavors.
Functional imaging and lesion studies suggest that affect
and emotion play critical roles in decision-making [45].
Continuous losses elicited strong frustration and negative
mood, which may disturb the decision-making process
and require participants to engage more cognitive effort.
In summary, the performance and neural activation in
LOSS trials is consistent with gambler’s fallacy, and in-
dicates frustration and greater engagement of executive
Figure 5 Brain areas showing stronger activation when comparing LOSS to CONTROL. Left: The activation including left ventral striatum,
anterior cingulate cortex, the thalamus, and middle temporal gyrus. Right: Beta figures showed the difference was driven by LOSS.
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regions.
‘Hot hand’ fallacy after continuous wins
In WIN condition, people also tend to repeat their previ-
ous selections (67.21% of the same key). This should not
be viewed as gambler’s fallacy although it is similar to
LOSS. The RT in WIN is significantly shorter than that in
LOSS, which means that subjects just followed their previ-
ous win selections without much consideration in WIN
than in LOSS. This suggests that less conflicting process
or cognitive endeavor was engaged in the decision making
process after continuous wins. This is consistent with our
imaging data where frontal network showed decreased ac-
tivities when comparing WIN to LOSS.
Increased activities in caudate were observed when
comparing WIN trials to LOSS trials. Significantcorrelations between the activation in caudate and the
repeat rates in WIN condition also support this conclu-
sion. The caudate nucleus was reported to be involved in
anticipation and performance-related feedback [26,27].
More interestingly, a recent study using a guessing
task with monetary outcomes showed that the caud-
ate was recruited only at the time when participants
believed that there were contingencies between their
actions and the subsequent results (received a re-
ward or punishment) [46]. The comparison results
showed that the caudate activation in WIN-stick is
significant higher than in WIN-switch, which means
that the process of stick to previous choices involved
more caudate activities in WIN. These results pro-
vide support to the role of caudate in hot-hand fal-
lacy. Thus, we can speculate that the continuous win
reinforced their decisions and resulted in faster and
Figure 7 Correlation between behavioral performance and brain activations in relevant brain regions. Left: Correlation between mean
RTs in LOSS-CONTROL and the brain activity in inferior frontal gyrus in LOSS-CONTROL. Right: Correlation between repeat rates in WIN and the
brain activities in caudate in WIN.
Figure 6 Brain areas showing different activations when comparing WIN to LOSS. Left: The increased activation showed in bilateral
caudate. Lower activation was found in inferior frontal gyrus and superior frontal gyrus. Right: The Beta figures showed that the difference in IFG
was driven by the higher activation in LOSS. However, the difference in caudate was driven by the higher activation in WIN.
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Figure 8 Brain activities in interested brain regions in stick or switch trials in WIN and LOSS. a: IFG activation in LOSS-stick and LOSS-
switch; b: Caudate activation in WIN-stick and WIN-switch.
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(the ‘Hot hand’ fallacy).Limitations
Although studies have shown that men traditionally have
been more likely than women to gamble. However, there is
gender difference in the types of gambling (males:
strategic-typed preferences in gambling; and females’
gambling preferences: non-strategic forms (e.g. slot
machine) [47]). In addition, men were stated as ‘more
action-oriented’ while women were described as ‘escape-
oriented’ in their motivations of gambling [48]. Thus, only
males were included in this study might limit the external
validity of current results.Conclusions
Human decision-making is often affected by prior selec-
tions and their outcomes. In this study, we measured the
behavioral performances and brain activations in deci-
sion process by creating continuous wins and loss situa-
tions. The result is valuable in understanding the
behavioral and biological underpinnings during decision
making and gambling process.
In conclusion, our study has shown both continuous
wins and losses exert influence on following decision-
making. First, both in WIN and LOSS, a higher desire
to win was elicited (increased activation in the meso-
limbic pathway). Second, in the context of continuous
losses, the decision making process may require more
cognitive control to resolve the conflict/negative emo-
tion (higher frontal brain activation). Gambler’s fallacy
may underlie their persistence with a previously
punished decision. Third, after winning a gamble, the
positive results heightened their confidence in decision-
making (increased activities in caudate in WIN), which is
known as the ‘hot hand’ fallacy.Abbreviations
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